How to interpret autonomy plays a crucial role that leads to different readings in Kant’s moral metaphysics, philosophy of religion and moral psychology. In this paper I argue for a two-layered conception of autonomy with varying degrees of justification for each: autonomy as a capacity and autonomy as a paragon-like paradigm. I argue that, all healthy rational humans possess the inalienable capacity of autonomy, i.e. share the universal ground for the communicability of objective basic moral principles. This initial understanding stands for autonomy as a capacity about which we have can talk of universal validity and justification. Nevertheless, the way one fully actualizes herself, her freedom, namely autonomy, is determined by her initial conception of autonomy and moral view of the world. Autonomy as an organic experience of real moral agents, which means an ongoing, non-static, irreducible and inexplicable judgmental process about one’s actualization of oneself gives way to consider autonomy as a godlike state of the soul even though one fails to provide objective validity for this. My reading of Kant, starting from moral objectivism towards aesthetic-religious judgment is parasitic upon this differentiation.